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Predators and Peace: Explaining the Failure of the
Pakistani Conﬂict Settlement Process in 2013-4
Talat Farooqa, Scott Lucasb and Stefan Wolﬀ b
aIslamabad Policy Research Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan; bDepartment of Political Science
and International Studies, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
ABSTRACT
Did US drone strikes cause the unravelling of the Pakistani conﬂict settlement
process between the government and the TTP in 2013-14? In answering this
question, we present strong, ﬁeldwork-based evidence that the eﬀects of
leadership decapitation, civilian casualties, and loss of legitimacy and credibility
as a negotiation partner by both the government and the TTP interacted in the
context of speciﬁc social, political and cultural characteristics of a tribal society.
We ﬁnd that drone strikes ‘produced’ some of these factors, but not all, which
allows us to conclude with four concrete policy recommendations for rethink-
ing the use of drones.
Introduction
Between 2004 and 2014, successive US Administrations launched more than
four hundred strikes by Predator drones in the Waziristan agencies of
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).1 The frequency of the
strikes increased after 2008, rising sharply between 2010 and 2014.2 By the
end of 2014, up to 3,096 fatalities were reported, of whom up to 960 were
civilians.3 Consequently, an anti-drone narrative gained importance in
Pakistan, sustained by print and electronic media, politicians, and a cross-
section of civil society, which was also aimed at those within the Pakistani
military and civilian establishment suspected of colluding with the US. One of
the claims made in this narrative is that US drone strikes have been
a signiﬁcant barrier to achieving a peaceful settlement of the conﬂict
between the Pakistani government and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).4
The main reasons in support of this argument are that the strikes help to
create more terrorists than they eliminate (Hudson et al. 2011, Cavallaro et al.
2012); that they foster jihadist sentiment and militant recruitment (Hali 2012,
Awan 2013) and that drone strikes ‘consistently kill Pakistani civilians, which
anger the population, and prompt revenge attacks from the militants’
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(Bergen and Tiedemann 2010). In addition, the killing of the TTP commander
Wali-ur-Rehman by a drone strike in May 2013 and of his successor
Hakimullah Mehsud in a strike the following October, are considered as
having dealt serious blows to the possibility of peace negotiations between
the Pakistani government and the TTP (Anon 2012a, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c,
2013d, 2013e, 2013f).
This literature, however, leaves a signiﬁcant gap in our understanding of
the Pakistani conﬂict settlement process in 2013–14. First, much of it predates
the period from late-2013 to mid-2014 when serious eﬀorts to begin formal
negotiations between the Pakistani government and the TTP were under
way.5 Second, eﬀects on conﬂict settlement are, more often than not,
a peripheral concern at best, with most of the literature considering drone
strikes primarily in the context of US counter-terrorism (Bergen and
Tiedemann 2011, Boyle 2013, Hazelton 2013, Johnston and Sarbahi 2016,
Jordan 2014, Lehrke and Schomaker 2016) and its domestic and international
legal foundations or lack thereof (Reinold 2011, McCrisken 2013, Ahmad
2014, Crawford et al. 2017, Trenta 2018).6 Third, there is almost no literature
speciﬁcally on the relationship between drone strikes and peace negotiations
in Pakistan.7
Fourth, there is also a gap in the existing literature from
a methodological perspective. We do not suggest that US drone strikes
generally have had no negative consequences or speciﬁcally have not
aﬀected the conﬂict settlement process in Pakistan; however, we contend
that the analysis underpinning the anti-drone narrative is too narrow and
even misleading in its construction of the US strikes as the primary reason
for the absence not only of a negotiated settlement but of negotiations. The
existing literature asks about the eﬀect (success or failure of counter-
terrorism, counter-insurgency, etc.) of one particular cause (drone strikes)
and then concludes that the assumed cause has comprehensive explana-
tory power for the observed eﬀect. We pursue a methodologically diﬀerent
approach by asking about the causes of eﬀects, starting from the observa-
tion of the eﬀect (futile attempts to initiate a process of formal peace
negotiations in 2013–148) and then seeking to establish its causes. This
leaves open the possibility of a sole cause, such as drone strikes, but allows
us to proceed with a theoretically-driven inquiry in which we ﬁrst establish
a list of theoretically plausible causes, as comprehensively as possible, and
then investigate them with a view to identifying all those which are rele-
vant. Doing so, we not only establish probable cause-eﬀect relationships
but also eliminate causes that existing theories might suggest but which are
not relevant in the case of Pakistan. This approach allows us further to
establish, in a more nuanced way, the role that drone strikes have played to
date in the failed attempts to bring about negotiations on a settlement of
the conﬂict between the TTP and successive Pakistani governments and to
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elucidate more comprehensively the causes of this failure, including possi-
ble interactions between them.
Filling this gap in the existing literature is not only worthwhile from the
perspective of empirical knowledge and theoretical understanding, but
also from a policy perspective. While we must be careful not to over-
claim the generalisability of ﬁndings based on a single case study, we
present strong evidence of ‘multiple and conjunctural causation’ (Ragin
1987, p. 23ﬀ.) of the fate of the attempted peace talks in Pakistan in
2013–14, in which the eﬀects of leadership decapitation, civilian casualties,
and loss of legitimacy and credibility as a negotiation partner by both the
government (primarily as a result of its alleged complicity with the drones
campaign) and the TTP (primarily because of its fragmentation) interacted
in the context of speciﬁc social, political and cultural characteristics of
a tribal society. Drone strikes ‘produced’ some of these factors, but not
all. This suggests four concrete policy implications for the impact of aban-
doning and/or rethinking the use of drones, the conditions under which
either of these may have positive eﬀects for a future peace process, and the
trade-oﬀs involved concerning other objectives of the drone campaign,
especially US counter-terrorism.
In the next two sections, we outline the theoretical framework that guides
the subsequent empirical analysis and reﬂect in more detail on our methods of
data collection and analysis. Section 4 oﬀers an evaluation of our hypotheses
based on an analytical narrative for the period under consideration, drawing on
thirty interviews and a two-part survey, all conducted during ﬁeldwork in
Pakistan in between May and September 2014. The interviewees included
current and former politicians and members of the Pakistani security services,
as well as diplomats, tribesmen, journalists and analysts, whereas four hundred
tribal respondents were approached for the two-part survey. In Section 5, we
focus on an additional factor identiﬁed in the course of our analysis – the role of
tribes. Often neglected in discussions of the impact of drones on the peace
process in Pakistan, we demonstrate that the destruction of tribal structures, in
part caused by the US drones campaign, is a critical element in the under-
standing of the diﬃculties of the Pakistani peace process. We conclude in
Section 6, emphasising that the US drone campaign in FATA is only one of
several factors that, in conjunction with others, have inﬂuenced the attempted
conﬂict settlement negotiations between the Pakistani government and the
TTP in 2013–14.
Theoretical Framework: Conﬂict Settlement in a Counter-terrorism/
Counter-insurgency Context
To understand the failure of peaceful conﬂict settlement eﬀorts (as opposed
to the inability of either side to win a decisive military victory), our principal
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points of reference are theories of conﬂict settlement, and speciﬁcally the
issue of what accounts for the possibility of initiation, conduct, and conclu-
sion of negotiations on a settlement. The ﬁrst dimension – negotiation
initiation – is particularly pertinent in the case of Pakistan and for the period
under consideration and it is the primary puzzle we attempt to solve in this
study. Why did attempts to start formal negotiations fail over a 12-month
period in 2013–14, and why could contacts not progress beyond exploratory
talks? Given the context of drone strikes which killed senior TTP ﬁgures in May
and October 2013, these questions oﬀer a critical point of intersection: a long-
standing, and largely inconclusive, debate on the eﬃcacy of decapitation
strategies in the counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency literature (e.g., Carvin
2012) that overlaps with a strand of the broader conﬂict settlement literature
emphasising the importance of leadership and leaders’ decisions to engage
in, or withdraw from, exploratory settlement negotiations (e.g., King 1997).
Without trying to resolve the debates between and within the diﬀerent
schools of thought on leadership decapitation, we use them to examine
plausible ways in which such an approach might aﬀect the prospects of
initiating negotiations.
On the one hand, some scholars argue that drone strikes are eﬀective in
degrading capability and morale of the organisations whose leadership is
targeted (Wilner 2010), limiting planning and organisational eﬀectiveness
(Anderson 2013), and signiﬁcantly weakening terrorist groups (Byman
2013). The reasoning underpinning these arguments is that weaker groups
are more likely to be willing to negotiate as their prospects of winning an
outright military victory diminish. Powerful counter-arguments contend that
(1) the use of drones for targeted killing leads to the ascent of less restrained
terrorist leaders who are likely to increase civilian targeting (Abrahms and
Mierau 2015) and the number of attacks (Lehrke and Schomaker 2016), and
(2) organisational decline is less likely following leadership decapitation,
especially in separatist and religious organisations (Jenna Jordan 2009).
This debate on decapitation overlaps with the consideration of unin-
tended consequences. Captured in the notion of ‘blowback’, the argument
here is that drone strikes enhance the ability of terrorist organisations to
recruit more members, foster an increase in revenge strikes against military
and/or civilian targets, undermine the legitimacy of domestic governments,
and spread and intensify anti-American and anti-Western attitudes among
populations and governments alike,9 contributing to the phenomena of
‘home-grown terrorism’ and ‘foreign ﬁghters’. This debate is largely incon-
clusive and ﬁndings are often highly context-dependent, even though sup-
porters of blowback appear more numerous (Hudson et al. 2011, Cronin 2013,
Boyle 2013) than those who see some utility in drones for select purposes
(Johnston and Sarbahi 2016) and those who ﬁnd little or no evidence to
sustain a case for blowback (Swift 2012, Shah 2018).10 For our argument, the
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signiﬁcance of the debates is how drone strikes have aﬀected the TTP-
government peace process in Pakistan. Several explanations would appear
plausible:
(1) Leadership decapitation eliminated credible negotiators on the TTP
side, increased diﬃculties for new/remaining leaders to discuss nego-
tiations in a safe environment, required the movement to save face by
withdrawing from a nascent peace process, and hardened existing and
new members’ and new leaders’ resolve to seek a military solution.
(2) Civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure increased support for
the TTP, swelled its ranks with new, vengeful recruits, andmade it more
diﬃcult for ‘moderates’ to (continue to) make a case for a negotiated
settlement.
(3) Amid the alleged complicity of the Pakistani state in the U.S. drone
campaign, the government lost legitimacy and credibility as a partner
for the TTP in any potential peace process.
While we may ﬁnd evidence in our empirical analysis to substantiate one or
more of these hypothesised causal mechanisms linking drone strikes to the
failure to initiate formal negotiations between those on both sides with the
authority to make and implement decisions, this would not necessarily
equate to a comprehensive explanation. As we are not seeking the eﬀects
of a particular cause, but rather the causes of a speciﬁc eﬀect, we also need to
identify additional plausible explanations and conﬁrm or disconﬁrm them.
For this, we turn back to the broader conﬂict settlement literature.
A number of diﬀerent arguments have been put forward to explain the
failure to initiate negotiations for a conﬂict settlement. These are related to
the conﬂict parties, their relationship with each other, and the broader
external context of the conﬂict and its potential settlement process.
Existing literature has established the importance of identity (Rothman
and Olson 2001, Aggestam 2002), arguing in particular that incompatible
identities, denying each other’s right to exist on equal terms, make nego-
tiated settlements diﬃcult to achieve. They prevent the reciprocal recogni-
tion of the legitimacy of each party’s claims (Heraclides 1989, Svensson 2007,
Bell 2014) and make it seem less likely that the other side will make mean-
ingful concessions and compromises to a party acknowledged as an ‘equal’ in
negotiations (Albin and Druckman 2012). This reduces the sense of opportu-
nity associated with negotiations (Kelman 1982) and limits parties’ motivation
to seek, and optimism to ﬁnd, a negotiated settlement (Pruitt 1997).
The willingness of conﬂict parties to enter into negotiations on
a settlement is frequently also associated with their relative material capabil-
ities. In particular, the notions of the mutually hurting stalemate and the ripe
moment for seeking a settlement have become prominent: parties that are
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relatively equally balanced in their military capabilities and unable to achieve
a decisive military victory become locked in a situation in which they must
seek alternatives to a military strategy (Zartman 2001). This then creates
a speciﬁc window of opportunity (Bapat 2005, Ruhe 2015).
A similar focus on capability has led to arguments that insurgent groups
which are more evenly matched with government forces in military terms
are more likely to force negotiations, and even more likely to do so if they
expect to be able to extract desired concessions (Cunningham et al. 2009)
and are less fearful of a government’s future defection from a negotiated
settlement (Clayton 2013). In contrast, fragmented or fragmenting conﬂict
parties have an adverse impact on the initiation (and successful conclusion
and implementation) of settlement negotiations because they produce
multiple veto players with potentially diverging interests (Cunningham
2006), who are therefore less ﬂexible in their approach to negotiations
(Walch 2016).
The possibility of initiating settlement negotiations has also been set in the
broader external context of the conﬂict in question. One school of thought
emphasises the importance of third-party mediators that help (or nudge)
parties to the negotiation table (Bercovitch and Kadayifci 2002). Equally
important are guarantors who can oﬀer credible protection against defection
(Walter 1997, Pearson et al. 2006), increasing the probability of parties enga-
ging in negotiations as they see a greater likelihood in the long term of
retaining concessions obtained in a settlement.
This brief overview of the conﬂict settlement literature on factors relevant
to the initiation of negotiations suggests additional plausible explanations for
our case. The reasons why the stage of formal negotiations between the top
TTP and the Pakistani decision-makers was never reached in 2013–14, despite
oﬀers and acceptances from both sides on diﬀerent occasions, may also be
found in one or more of the following:
(4) There is nomutually hurting stalemate between the parties, with either
the government expecting to be able to defeat the Taliban militarily, or
the Taliban considering itself strong enough to hold out and gradually
improve its bargaining position over time.
(5) Both sides may be too fragmented internally to make credible, and
thus acceptable, oﬀers to initiate formal negotiations. The opposing
side sees little likelihood in achieving and retaining desirable conces-
sions in a negotiation process, in part because some factions may deny
the other party’s legitimacy.
(6) The settlement process lacks external mediators and guarantors that
could bring the parties to the table and contribute to sustaining
a negotiated settlement.
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To summarise, our aim in this study is to understand the reasons for the
inability of the Pakistani government and TTP to progress to sustained formal
conﬂict settlement negotiations in 2013–14 despite publicly stated commit-
ments to do so. Based on broader engagement with existing literature on
why attempts to initiate settlement negotiations succeed or fail, beyond the
widely held belief that drone strikes are the primary cause of failure in the
Pakistani case, we have established several plausible explanations that can be
empirically examined.
Approach
In light of this theoretical framework and our overall question about the
failure to move beyond exploratory talks to initiate formal peace negotiations
in Pakistan in 2013–14, several methodological considerations follow. In
determining our approach, we had to consider our data requirements to
decide our methods of data collection and analysis. With six distinct plausible
explanations for the failure of conﬂict settlement eﬀorts in 2013/14, we had
distinct data requirements for each. We formulate these as observations that
we would expect to make if a potential explanation is valid on its own or in
conjunction with other mechanisms.
By way of illustration how we operationalise this approach,11 let us brieﬂy
consider our ﬁrst potential explanation. We formulated this as follows:
‘Leadership decapitation eliminated credible negotiators on the TTP side,
increased diﬃculties for new/remaining leaders to discuss negotiations in
a safe environment, required the movement to save face by withdrawing
from a nascent peace process, and hardened members’ and new leaders’
resolve to seek a military solution.’ If this were true, we would expect to make
a number of observation, including that assassinations of insurgent leaders is
followed by a breakdown in negotiations, Taliban withdrawal from negotia-
tions, or break-oﬀ of pre-negotiation engagements. In addition, we might see
that no Taliban negotiation team is nominated and that no joint negotiation
platform among Taliban factions emerges. Moreover, attacks on government
forces and alleged collaborators would likely increase. In terms of commu-
nicating their response, we would expect that Taliban rhetoric becomes more
aggressive and that their stated opposition to a negotiated settlement would
increase. Evidence of these observations could be gathered from two princi-
ple data sources. The ﬁrst would be relevant interlocutor statements in inter-
views and the surveys we have carried out, for example pointing out diﬃculty
of remaining senior leaders to meet and discuss negotiations. Second, we
would expect media coverage and secondary/grey literature reporting a lack
of meetings among senior Taliban, more fractious internal debates and lack of
consensus among Taliban factions.
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Given the speciﬁc circumstances in our particular case, for this and all other
potential explanations, we have to consider the feasibility of various data
collection methods, assessing and balancing what data is available and
accessible and then evaluating its credibility. Working in a fragile and conﬂict-
aﬀected environment like Pakistan and on a politically highly sensitive and
emotionally charged topic has potentially signiﬁcant methodological
implications.12 Data is relatively limited, its credibility not always beyond
doubt, and accessibility presents another frequently encountered problem.
This aﬀects more or less all types of sources, from surveys and interviews to
print and electronic media, from oﬃcial documents and statements to so-
called grey literature and existing scholarship. Even where interlocutors are
willing to share information, they may be exposed to retribution. Interviewers
are also potentially at risk, and mitigating the risk for them might increase
that for interlocutors and/or make it impossible for them to provide useful
information,13 while interviews with others are simply not possible.14
To mitigate the resulting diﬃculties, we adopted several strategies.
Initially, we built as comprehensive as possible a deep and shared under-
standing of the case among the three researchers, drawing on the knowledge
and understanding of a local and an external expert and of a comparativist
with no prior case knowledge,15 a comprehensive survey of secondary litera-
ture, and a detailed examination of media sources and the grey literature,16
especially as they pertained to the time period under consideration.
Following the development of our theoretical framework, we reached
agreement on the range of issues to pursue in semi-structured interviews
and in a survey.17 We then split tasks among the three researchers involved in
the project: the local expert conducted the interviews and the survey (allow-
ing us to make the best use of local networks), while the comparativist
analysed and subsequently coded the interviews18 and developed a ﬁrst
draft of the main argument based on the available empirical evidence,
including ﬁndings from the survey. In parallel, the local expert and the
external case expert developed an analytical narrative covering the period
under observation, based on the local expert’s identiﬁcation of themes and
patterns in the interviews as well as the survey results and other primary
material and secondary sources. This way, the development of our ﬁnal
argument based on two separate analyses enabled us to avoid possible
conﬁrmation bias, while simultaneously making use of the diﬀerent types of
expertise we all brought to the table and to triangulate data obtained from
our interviews, survey and other primary and secondary sources. This trian-
gulation, in turn, helped us to weigh diﬀerent sources of data in terms of how
much signiﬁcance we would assign to the evidence they provided, i.e., the
larger a cross-section of sources supported the same claim the more weight
we gave it.19 This also helped us to avoid being drawn into particular
perspectives from just one or two subsets of our interlocutors. For example,
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we were careful to make sure not to over-rely on the perspectives of political
and military insiders in our own analysis, using the insights they oﬀered as
data points in our own analytical narrative rather than adopting their
perspectives.20
Assessing the Causes for the Failure to Initiate Sustained Formal
Talks
Based on the analysis of our primary and secondary data, we can now oﬀer
a more detailed discussion of the plausibility of each of these explanations
on their own and in various combinations with each other. Our evidence
suggests a nuanced argument: the escalation of the US drone campaign
between 2009 and 2013 was not the primary cause of the failure to pursue
a political settlement. Neither was it the primary cause for the entry of the
Pakistani Government and the TTP into talks in autumn 2013. Strikes did
not block or encourage negotiations.21 The assassinations of TTP leaders in
2013 did not derail progress towards the eventual opening of exploratory
talks in early 2014. Conversely, the suspension of drone attacks did not
prevent the collapse of the process later in the year. While the strikes and
the narratives constructed around them had an eﬀect, they did so as
factors within a broader and more complex political, social and cultural
context.
In line with Hypothesis 1, on decapitation strikes as an obstacle to the
initiation of negotiations, most of our interlocutors saw a clear connections.
Almost one-third, across the spectrum of people with whom we talked,
pointed to a negative impact of decapitation including the limits put on
TTP leaders’ freedom of movement. As one of our interviewees, a former
Pakistani Ambassador, put it:
The Taliban couldn’t arrange meetings or talk to each other because of [their]
fear [of the drones]. At the very start, when the drone strikes began, they
used to be careful during the day time and wandered in the nights. Now,
when the technology was developed, they thought these rascals can see us
even in the night, so do not get closer. So they couldn’t get together to reach
a consensus on whether to hold a dialogue with the Pakistani government or
not.22
This view was corroborated by tribesmen noting that ‘drone attacks restricted
their movement’23 and that the constant operation of drones ‘aﬀects the
process of negotiations because the TTP leaders cannot congregate in one
place without fear of being killed.’24
These fears were further heightened by the killing of TTP leader
Hakimullah Mehsud on 31 October 2013, days before formal negotiations
between the sides were to begin. There was widespread agreement among
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interlocutors that this could have derailed the political process even before it
had started. ‘Before the PML-N was even in parliament they killed the pro-
talks Wali-ur-Rehman and later Hakimullah who had also shown willingness
to talk,’ pointed out a former diplomat hailing from Waziristan, arguing that
the killings impacted the possibility of conﬂict settlement.25 A FATA journalist
summarised the public perception: ‘The drone strike that killed Hakimullah
was fundamentally detrimental for the peace talks. Had that drone strike not
happened, there could have been peace in the area.’26
But this interpretation fails to take account of the actual chronology of
events, in which other developments had forestalled the opening of
negotiations. A Pakistani intelligence oﬃcial and expert on FATA reminded
us:
The initial peace initiative had broken down almost two weeks before
Hakimullah Mehsud’s killing because the government had rejected the TTP’s
demand to release three Taliban commanders. The militants wanted to nomi-
nate them as their representatives in the dialogue. These commanders were in
military custody and had confessed to killing security personnel in Swat in 2008
and to their links with foreign intelligence agencies. There was no way the
military was going to release them.27
Even before Hakimullah Mehsud’s death, the in-ﬁghting threatened to frac-
ture the insurgency, with disagreements between the Punjabi Taliban and the
TTP Shura over proposed dialogue. ‘It’s a tribally structured society,’ argued
a former diplomat from FATA, ‘so people always suspect each other of being
a government beneﬁciary or spy.’28 Further tensions were fed by claims,
circulated by the US State Department, that the May 2013 strike on Wali-ur-
Rehman was enabled by intelligence from a source in the Hakimullah faction
of the TTP (Murshed 2013).
It might be argued that the drone strikes were catalytic through fragmen-
tation preventing the credible oﬀering and accepting of negotiations. But, if
so, they had a paradoxical eﬀect when they were used by the Pakistani
Government and military. Far from refraining from any political engagement,
Islamabad sought to exploit the divisions within – in the words of Interior
Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan (2013) – ‘a loose conglomerate of at least 37
diﬀerent jihadist groups based in the tribal areas’ to explore talks with
factions willing to engage in the search for a political settlement.
The tactic achieved other goals. While the TTP council was forced to
devote its energies to mediating a ceaseﬁre amongst its own ranks
(Yusufzai 2014), Pakistani intelligence agencies could exploit the conﬂict
with an eye on outside actors, as an oﬃcial explained:
This divide-and-rule policy of the state exploits tribal and clan-loyalties and
familial rivalries . . . this is aimed at keeping militants involved in intra-group
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wrangling until other interested regional actors [India, Iran, and Afghanistan]
show their cards once the US draws down.29
The US pursuit of a counter-terrorism policy heavily reliant on drones might
contribute to the opening of negotiations, but not because Washington
envisaged this as a fundamental strategy. Instead, Pakistani actors had to
seize upon the strikes, within their counter-insurgency strategy to create
suitable conditions through pressure on the Taliban leadership.
Interlocutors with direct knowledge of the process rejected the idea
that the fate of the exploratory talks primarily rested upon the status of
the drone strikes. As one of them noted with respect to freedom of
movement:
TTP commanders and their committee kept changing the venue of internal
meetings in North Waziristan amid continued ﬂights of US drones . . . With 12 to
15 drones constantly conducting surveillance, it was diﬃcult for them to
congregate.
He added about primary responsibility:
The suspension of drone strikes [between December 2013 and June 2014] did
have some positive eﬀect and helped our eﬀorts to talk to some extent . . . but
the main obstacle was that the military did not agree to any exchange of
prisoners . . . and so the talks ﬂoundered in the very ﬁrst phase.30
Instead, just as drone strikes played a role in the process towards political
discussions once they were used by local actors, they helped create the
conditions dooming the discussions to failure – dependent on whether
those local actors seized upon them. The process of fragmentation that,
with Islamabad’s exploitation, brought the TTP – with its ‘37 diﬀerent jihadist
groups’ – to the table also inhibited any progress beyond initial explorations.
No single faction was strong enough to sustain talks, let alone deliver any
future agreement. During the negotiations, the Sajna and Shahryar groups –
whose rivalry dates ‘to the time of their great grandfathers’31 – began ﬁghting
over control of the TTP (Khan 2014), with an eventual split in the group when
the non-Mehsud Mullah Fazlullah was named TTP chief in May 2014 (Hashim
2014). By then, the government was pushing for exploratory talks about
peace deals with individual groups as members of its peace committee
concluded that reaching an ‘all-inclusive agreement’ with the TTP might
not be possible (Yousaf 2014a). The Interior Minister argued, ‘each [group
is] fully independent in decision making . . . holding peace talks with a single
group would be useless.’
Signiﬁcantly, the government dismissed claims that drones had any deci-
sive inﬂuence one way or another, arguing that the TTP was never serious
about the discussions and only sought a pause to regroup. Moreover, in the
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words of a member of the government peace committee, the government
view was that
drone strikes alone do not force the militants to give up . . . There is the fatigue
syndrome . . . diminishing number of volunteers . . . and the military was in
readiness for the operation.32
Thus, contrary to Hypothesis 4, any assumption that there was a mutually
hurting stalemate in place by early 2014 appears unfounded. Instead,
a Pakistani intelligence oﬃcer indicated that the military took advantage by
blaming the insurgents for the breakdown of exploratory talks while prepar-
ing for the North Waziristan oﬀensive in June 2014. According to a senior
security oﬃcial (quoted in Awan 2014), the political track gave way to
anticipation of future gains on the battleﬁeld:
I think the security services have achieved half of their target with the assistance
of government [peace committee] emissaries. The TTP is now visibly divided
into pro-peace and anti-peace groups, no matter what their so-called leaders
claim.
In a mirror image of the Government’s manoeuvre, the TTP also set aside the
American operations and focused on Islamabad’s position as they refused to
extend a month-long ceaseﬁre in spring 2014. They argued that ‘the govern-
ment has failed to respond positively to Taliban’s realistic demands of estab-
lishing a peace zone, release of non-combatants and suspension of security
forces operation in tribal areas’ (quoted in Sherazi 2014). A member of the
Mehsud tribe argued that ‘the TTP leadership belongs to a particular Pashtun
[Mehsud] group that does not take kindly to intimidation . . . Thus, any eﬀorts
to pressure them to participate in peace talks through drone attacks tend to
have the opposite eﬀect.’33
The Government and TTP positions were compounded by a perceived split
in Islamabad, with the army and intelligence services perceived as signiﬁ-
cantly less committed to achieving a negotiated settlement than the civilian
leadership. Thus, in line with Hypothesis 5, fragmentation was not only
a problem on the TTP side, and the Taliban were acutely aware of the
mismatch between civilian and military objectives. As a former Ambassador
pointed out, ‘Even after the suspension of drone attacks . . . [the TTP] were
afraid of the Pakistani military forces . . . .That’s why they demanded a peace
zone.’34 Another interlocutor, close to the TTP, echoed this, noting that ‘the
militants know that the Army is the strongest player and it has not been sold
on the peace process’,35 while another observed with regard to negotiations
that ‘the government and military do not see eye to eye on this.’36The TTP-
linked interlocutor bore out these assessments by talking of the conse-
quences ‘if the army is not on board’ with the political approach
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We know, whenever there is a peace process, the ﬁrst demand of the militants
would be the release of the prisoners from the custody of the security person-
nel. This we should have had anticipated before initiating the peace process
that they would ask for this and we would have to give them something as the
peace process entails give and take policy. So, when we were aware of that and
just started the peace process for the political gains, the process had to fail
regardless of the drone factor.37
Other interlocutors also attributed the collapse of the negotiation process in
May 2014, at least in part, to the army. Having lost soldiers in clashes in
FATA, as well as in high-proﬁle attacks on military installations,38 comman-
ders were always suspicious of peace deals that had earlier been used by
insurgents to regroup and reorganise, for example in South Waziristan
(2004 & 2005) and Swat (2009). Moreover, even as the government
attempted to sustain exploratory talks, militant violence continued against
military and civilian assets. General Musharraf argued that the TTP, as
a close aﬃliate of Al Qa’eda, ‘does not recognise the state as legitimate . . .
They want to dismantle the system and impose their own brand of religious
governance.’ He summed up the military’s mistrust by calling the peace
process ‘nothing but a hoax’.39 This assumption that the TTP denied the
state’s legitimacy again points to the fundamental incompatibility in
approaches to even exploratory talks between the civilian government
and the military and serves as further conﬁrmation for Hypothesis 5 and
the problem of fragmentation on the Pakistani side. It also highlights
problematic disparities in identity and the extent to which some elements
in the military considered it inconceivable to accommodate the TTP with-
intheir own conception of the Pakistani state.
The approach of General Kiyani, who replaced Musharraf, oﬀered
a window for negotiations, but with Kiyani’s replacement, General Raheel
Sharif, it became clear that the Army was focused on an oﬀensive in North
Waziristan. Immediate retaliatory aerial bombings in TTP-controlled areas
demonstrated a ﬁrm response to any attacks by insurgents during the period
of exploratory talks. So even as exploratory talks were launched in 2014, for
some in the TTP a full-ﬂedged military operation in North Waziristan was
always a foregone conclusion. This, rather than drone strikes, was a more
immediate source of concern and added to the sense that the Taliban were
never serious about peace negotiations. As former ISI chief Ehsan-ul-Haq
argued, drone strikes were never a hindrance, although they were used by
the TTP as ‘a pretext to stall the peace process . . . [Even] when there were no
strikes for ﬁve months during the peace process, the TTP did not respond
positively and continued carrying out lethal attacks.’40
Though they were not central to the ultimate failure of the exploratory
talks, the US drones campaign, in line with Hypothesis 2, was signiﬁcant in
relation to civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure. According to one
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prominent anti-drone argument, this would have swelled the TTP ranks with
new recruits and side-lined moderates who would have made a case for
a negotiated settlement. While discussion of the sidelining of moderates
was mainly with concern to the fragmentation of the TTP (see above), many
of our interlocutors noted how so-called ‘collateral damage’ and the psycho-
logical stress inﬂicted upon FATA residents generally increased radicalisation
and helped the TTP with recruitment. As a senior army and ISI oﬃcer put it
to us:
[Drone strikes have] negative impacts . . . in terms of the negative perceptions
they generate and in terms of promotion of radicalization. Such radicalization is
not only limited to the target area but spreads among the larger population of
Pakistan who perceive such attacks as a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty.41
Even former President Musharraf echoed this when he noted, in relation to
possible negative consequences of the US drone campaign for popular
radicalisation and Taliban recruitment,
Possible, yes, I would like to admit, I think it does. The reasons being the
negative view of drone strikes in the minds of the public and because of
collateral damage . . . . people living in the [tribal] areas who suﬀer because of
drone strikes can move towards militancy . . . .Use of random drone strikes . . . is
likely to promote militancy among the people aﬀected. . . . The US . . . using
drone attacks . . . promotes terrorism.42
A tribal Malik linked the drones campaign to the cultural context in which
they occurred, ‘We live according to Pashtunwali and we can never forget
this . . . .It will only increase the younger generation’s urge for exacting
revenge’43, while a sitting Senator noted, ‘Our argument has always been
that when drone strikes . . . kill an entire family and just one youngster
survives, then do you think he cares whether suicide attacks are Islamic or un-
Islamic? He will do everything in his power to take revenge . . . ’44 A journalist
observed that ‘it is due to these drone attacks that you ﬁnd suicide bombers
in the area in hundreds’45. Similar sentiments were expressed by a range of
other interlocutors.46 One interlocutor summarised during a group discus-
sion: ‘The concept of badal (the right to avenge an injustice) against an
attacker, which is the hallmark of our society, comes into action . . . and
because we see the Pakistani state as complicit in drone attacks people do
join TTP to take revenge.’47
Our survey results also oﬀer a perspective on blowback. Of all respondents,
30% noted that the primary impact of drone strikes on the population in the
FATAs was a rise in terrorism. The proportion of respondents holding this
view increased dramatically from the June survey (23%) to the September
survey (37%). Similarly, 29% of all respondents considered drone attacks as
most detrimental to daily life and stability in the FATAs among several other
choices. Again, there is an interesting shift over time: the ﬁgure was 38% in
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the June survey, dropping to just 21% in the September survey. At the same
time, in June 37% of respondents considered the Pakistani army’s military
campaign as the key factor undermining daily and stability, whereas it was
56% in September. While we cannot infer strong causal links from these
survey data, they oﬀer circumstantial evidence in connection with our inter-
view data that some blowback did occur as a direct result of both the US
drones campaign and the Pakistani military campaign.48
This ﬁnding is in marked contrast to Shah’s study on blowback from the
drones campaign in Pakistan. Based on a larger interview sample than ours,
he ﬁnds no evidence for ‘the claim that drones provide a recruitment card for
militant organizations’ (Shah 2018, p. 82). We have no reason to doubt Shah’s
ﬁndings.49 The contradiction between his and ours may simply be due to
diﬀerent interview samples and both may adequately reﬂect genuinely held
beliefs by interlocutors, indicating diﬀerent perceptions and indicating the
range of opinion in Pakistani society. But our concern is with the eﬀect that
drone strikes, as one plausible factor, may have had in the context of formal
peace negotiations. From this perspective, a perception of a blowback eﬀect –
among, for example, government and army oﬃcials or tribal maliks – whether
it is correct or not, may be as detrimental as its actuality. This perception
changes potential calculations about the prospects of moving beyond
exploratory talks.50
As we suggested in Hypothesis 3, a government seen as condoning the US
drone campaign would lose public legitimacy and not be seen as a credible
negotiation partner by the Taliban. This collusion was a theme in many
interviews. The general consensus among interlocutors was that ‘without
the blessings of the governments and the military, these drone strikes cannot
take place’.51 What is important for our argument, however, is how interlo-
cutors thought about the eﬀects of collusion. A tribal Malik from North
Waziristan added, ‘As long as the Pakistani state is seen to be ﬁghting
America’s war there will be distrust and it is this [distrust] that hinders
dialogue.’52
A senior military oﬃcial hailing from FATA explained: ‘Drones impact
conﬂict resolution by widening mistrust between the state and society . . .
the role of intelligence agencies is paramount in this warfare and these
operations are by deﬁnition shadowy . . . mistrust is rampant (and) hurts any
peace process.’53
Our survey results also support the notion of a loss of government legiti-
macy as a result of the complex interplay between the US drones campaign
and domestic factors. In both surveys, roughly one-quarter of all respondents
considered post-9/11 cooperation between Pakistan and the US as the key
detrimental factor in causing instability in FATA.54 Taken together with the
fact that 31% and 26% of all respondents, respectively, saw the reason for
successive Pakistani governments’ cooperation with the US on drones in US
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ﬁnancial incentives and Pakistani government corruption, this adds further
credence to the notion of a government lacking legitimacy among key actors
in society. Moreover, 62% respondents in the June survey considered drone
attacks as primarily indicating government duplicity (condemning them in
public, while secretly cooperating with the US). However, following the
launch of the military operation in North Waziristan, this number drops by
24 percentage points. Instead, the share of respondents who see drone
strikes exposing the militants’ vulnerability increases to 80 % (from a mere
20% in June). While the magnitude of this shift in opinion may be a function
of the larger proportion of more recently displaced people in the September
survey, the more general point about the complex interaction of diﬀerent
factors, with drone strikes only one among them, still holds.
However, while collusion clearly was a powerful theme in the projection of
a negative impact of the US drone campaign on the peace process, the
overall picture was complex, with many more factors at play. A member of
the government peace committee noted:
The TTP played on the argument that the Pakistani government is too weak and
reliant on the US and it can’t even ask them to stop drone attacks so how can it
talk peace with us . . . So once the government convinced the US to halt attacks –
between December 2013 and June 2014 – this militant propaganda was
challenged.55
While this might suggest a clear, singular causal connection, our interviews
indicate that drone strikes were never the sole, and perhaps not even primary,
issue for the TTP.56 The militants’ initial broad demands – stopping the US
attacks, severing ties with Washington, and introducing constitutional
reforms to make Sharia the supreme law of the land – were narrowed during
the exploratory talks to withdrawing the Army from a designated peace zone
and allowing free movement to TTP leaders, releasing ‘non-combatant pris-
oners’ and ending the crackdown on Taliban members across the country
(Mohmand 2014, Yousaf 2014b). These were eventually the (pre-) conditions
on which the sides reluctantly agreed after the suspension of the US drones
campaign. Yet these talks broke down in May 2014, whilst this suspension
was still in force, making it at best a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for
both the initiation and sustenance of negotiations. The US drones campaign
and the narratives constructed around it were factors in both the start and
collapse of the exploratory talks,57 but as complementary rather than
mutually exclusive explanations. The impact of drones was mediated through
diﬀerent mechanisms, some of which predated both the US drones campaign
and the peace process. As a result, there were mixed outcomes. This was
perhaps most evident in the complex interplay of decapitation, fragmenta-
tion, and the start of exploratory talks in early 2014 and their collapse in May
that year.
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However, in the course of our analysis, we also identiﬁed another critical
factor in the fate of the peace process in 2013–14: the role of the tribes in
North Waziristan.
The Role of Tribal Actors in the Peace Process
Given only scant attention in existing literature,58 local tribes were not just
a passive observer of the interaction between the government/military, the
TTP, and the US. However, more than half of our interlocutors in the inter-
views emphasised the profound weakening of the tribal system and its
traditional cultural values challenged by the rise of an obscurantist version
of Islam. The key issue here is that prior to the destruction of tribal fabrics,
there were local mechanisms in place to deal with violence between tribes
and violence brought to the tribal areas from outside, such as the jirga
system.59
The catalyst for this change was the CIA-ISI use of religion in the 1980s
Afghan-Soviet Jihad. It was accelerated by the inﬂux of Taliban ﬁghters from
Afghanistan into North Waziristan after 9/11; the inability and unwillingness
of the Pakistani government and military to protect the tribes; and the
casualties caused by the US drones campaign and Pakistani military actions.
The elimination of many elders forced others to emigrate, further weakening
the system. As the Taliban and Al-Qaeda ﬁghters used Waziristan as
a sanctuary, they thus targeted the already weakened tribal structures:
The foreign ﬁghters, who arrived in FATA . . . did not adhere to these customary
laws and instead imposed their own extremist ideology on society . . . .[With]
their brutality against the weak, kidnapping and murder . . . this has been the
main blow to tribal structures.60
All these factors interacted in complex ways, but overall they contributed,
through the weakening of the tribal system, to increasing empowerment of
the militants on the one hand, and to growing distrust of the Pakistani state
on the other.61 In our survey, 47% of all respondents ranked Pakistani military
operations as the key factor in undermining the stability of tribal structures.
This deprived the government of an important ally in the ﬁght against foreign
ﬁghters and indigenous insurgents and in any negotiations with the TTP.
Unsurprisingly, this number was almost 20 percentage points higher in the
September 2014 survey after the launch of the Zarb-i-Azb military operation
in North Waziristan (37% in June compared to 56% in September). Almost
30% of all respondents ranked drone strikes as the key factor contributing to
the loss of stability, but with a declining share in the September survey (38%
in June compared to 21% in September).
By 2013, the tribes saw a Pakistani Army, overstretched from Swat to South
Waziristan, which was making convenient agreements with local Taliban.
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Already in contravention of the pledge of autonomy given to the tribes when
they joined the state of Pakistan in 1947,62 the military was now believed to
be acting against insurgents only half-heartedly. There was a growing con-
viction among tribesmen that the state was either unwilling or unable to
protect its citizens from ‘terrorists’. Accordingly, argued a tribesman, people
saw both the militants and the state as persecutors.63 Another interviewee
similarly observed:
The introduction of the army and the assumption by the army of the functions
assigned to the civil administration created a mindset in the tribal area that
these troops have come to safeguard the American interest in this area and to
promote American agenda in this area. This mindset created an insurgency in
the tribal area.64
In addition, a sitting Member of Parliament explained how the military’s
peace deals further entrenched the TTP in North Waziristan. ‘The Taliban
came here and disrupted the established jirga system, killed tribal elders
and contracted forced marriages . . . [while] the army . . . destroyed the
[administrative] authority of the district Political Agent.’ Instead of resorting
to the traditional methods conﬂict resolution, he argued further, a senior
army commander approached the militants directly. This lack of familiarity
with tribal culture was perceived as the army’s weakness to the beneﬁt of the
terrorists.65
This growing distrust of the military in particular, was reinforced by
a leader of a religious political party representing the TTP in the Sharif
initiated peace talks:
We do not absolve the Taliban . . . .They have played a big role in destroying the
[tribal] system . . . .But one must also remember that when Musharraf deployed
military in tribal areas, he violated a long-respected agreement between the
tribes and the state of Pakistan . . . This act in itself was detrimental to the tribal
system of Jirga and Masharan [elders] because now the army commanders
began to hold direct talks with the militants . . . .They were not from the tribal
areas and they had no knowledge or experience of the tribal way of resolving
disputes or of the psyche of the tribesmen.66
To strengthen their position, insurgents particularly targeted the tribal jirga
(council of elders) to further erode traditional methods of conﬂict resolution.
The military’s deployment into FATA, their deals with the Taliban, and their
inability to protect the tribal system created conditions in which the TTP’s
parallel justice system became entrenched, further increasing the gulf
between the tribes and the Pakistani state. According to a tribesman from
North Waziristan:
They give you the option of trial by Rawaj, tribal custom or Sharia, Islamic law.
Should one decide the trial by Rawaj, then jirga is held and a compromise is
reached; however, in case of Sharia, local Taliban scholars decide the matter.
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Taliban have the power to make the guilty party obey the decisions of their
jirga. That is why people normally choose Taliban over the state.67
The US drones campaign further exacerbated these negative eﬀects. Before
9/11, there were thousands of elders across the FATA who were elected from
their villages to the jirga, in what the Pashtun see as a representative system
of governance.68 Between 2007 and 2014 the TTP killed hundreds of these
elders – diﬀerent estimates give diﬀerent numbers69 – thereby ‘wiping out
the traditional leadership’, according to refugees from North Waziristan (S.
Shah 2014, A. Shah 2018).
Targeting the elders to strengthen their control of the region, militants
used drone attacks as a pretext for reprisals, eliminating who could have
served as mediators. One tribesman summarised this counter-productivity of
US drone strikes even when they hit intended victims: ‘When US drones
target [TTP] leadership, the Taliban also kill our leaders and elders. This is
simple cause and eﬀect.’70 Accordingly, 31% of respondents saw a rise in
violence as the primary impact of drone strikes in Waziristan.71
Using the drone attacks as a reference point, the TTP exploited the tribal
value of badal (revenge) not only to create terror but also to sow confusion,
pre-empting tribal outrage against atrocities. The murder of elders and state
functionaries could be committed and justiﬁed in the name of exacting
revenge against the military operations of a government that was an ally of
the US. As the American drone strikes increased in 2009, Al Qaeda created
a group of ﬁghters who tracked down and eliminated suspects (Farooq and
Kakakhel 2014). A tribal student said, ‘The TTP kills anyone they think is a spy
who may have given intelligence for drone strikes.’72 Even if they wanted to
cooperate with state institutions such as the military, tribes now found it far
more diﬃcult, as a tribal interviewee explained:
Tribal elders [either] no more exist [or] a great number has left the area. The rest
who are still living there, are playing both ways as they keep the Taliban and the
military happy so that they can survive . . . . If I dare to go and meet any military
commander then it is sure that onmy way back I will be killed or interrogated by
the Taliban. People who work for the army must have links with Taliban – there
is always this double game.73
The erosion of the tribal system and loss of many respected elders in the
crossﬁre between the Taliban, the Pakistani military, and the US drones meant
that there was no traditional powerful intermediary between the state and
the TTP leadership – an intermediary who could have pressured or incenti-
vised the insurgents to enter into, and remain in, peace negotiations with the
government.
The insurgents’ hand was further strengthened by the perceived high level
of civilian casualties from drone attacks, with one tribal interviewee
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estimating that ‘95% of those killed’ were not ﬁghters.74 More than half of
respondents – 54% – said that drone strikes kill more civilians than
terrorists.75
A tribesman cited a March 2011 drone attack on a jirga in North Waziristan,
which killed about 40 tribal elders who had gathered to resolve an internal
dispute over resources.76 Other incidents occurred because of the ﬂaws of
human intelligence: a tribesman from North Waziristan said information was
not always correct, and sometimes faulty intelligence was provided to the US
for ﬁnancial gains or to settle scores leading to the loss of innocent lives.77 In
the 2014 Survey, 65% of tribal respondents did not see drones as eﬀective at
disrupting terrorist activities, and 54% did not believe drones were useful in
intelligence gathering and reconnaissance.78
The erosion of the traditional tribal system destroyed local capacity to deal
with violence and destabilisation. One of our interviewees put the blame for
this squarely on the Pakistani state, ‘We who are from FATA were demanding
from the beginning don’t deploy over there, no shelling . . . no drones . . .
There is a tribal way to tackle them (militants).’79 A tribal elder emphasised
that the opportunity to resolve the conﬂict through the established tribal
system was missed because of US and Pakistani interventions, and particu-
larly the failure of the Pakistanis state to protect the tribal system:
The tribesmen have their own way of resolving their problems within the
parameters of Pashtunwali. The US and Pakistan have made matters worse by
directly intervening . . . The people of Waziristan should have been allowed to
tackle the problem in accordance with their traditions and the state should have
provided the backing and shown the will to protect us . . . this would have given
us the incentive to resolve or problems with the militants directly and the
militants too would have listened to us knowing that the state is right behind
us.80
The ill-judged actions of the Pakistani state in the tribal areas after 9/11 thus
created the conditions for, and sustained, an insurgency while simultaneously
undermining local capacity to contribute to any peace process.
The social, political, and cultural dynamics of the FATA, playing out in the
wake of the destruction of core elements of the tribal system, were a major
factor that ampliﬁed the negative eﬀects of the US drones campaign on the
peace process. They accentuated the problems of the decapitation strategy
(Hypothesis 1) and increased fragmentation (Hypothesis 5), causing signiﬁ-
cant levels of civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure (Hypothesis 2).
In the context of a severely weakened customary system of conﬂict resolution
and in the absence of a mutually hurting stalemate (Hypothesis 4), hardliners
were strengthened and had signiﬁcant opportunities to further undermine
the legitimacy of the Pakistani state (Hypothesis 3). It is this understanding of
the interactions between the diﬀerent factors that allows us to oﬀer
a meaningful explanation of the initiation and collapse of the short-lived
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peace process in Pakistan in 2013–14 and of the role of the US drone
campaign within it.
Conclusion
Our analysis of the government-initiated peace process between
September 2013 and June 2014 highlighted that drone attacks were neither
the driving force behind the initiation of the government-TTP talks nor the
primary reason for the failure of this exploratory dialogue about formal peace
negotiations.
This ﬁlls a signiﬁcant gap in the existing literature on the eﬀects of drone
strikes in three dimensions. First, to our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst compre-
hensive scholarly analysis of the relationship between drone strikes and the
inconclusive peace process in Pakistan in 2013–14. Second, and based on this
empirical analysis, we contribute a more nuanced theoretical understanding
of the impact of drone strikes on a peace process as part of multiple and
conjunctural causes, rather than as a singular cause with comprehensive
explanatory power.
Third, by reconnecting our analysis to our theoretical discussion about
conﬂict settlement in a counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency context, and
conscious of the limited generalisability of our ﬁndings, we can point to
several potentially signiﬁcant policy implications.
Our analysis found that the eﬀects of leadership decapitation, civilian
casualties, and both the government’s and TTP’s fragmentation and loss of
legitimacy and credibility as a negotiation partner interacted in the context of
speciﬁc social, political and cultural characteristics of a tribal society to
ultimately doom the prospects of a successful peace process in 2013–14.
From a policy perspective, it is important to reiterate that drone strikes
‘produced’ some of these factors, and exacerbated others, but not all. Thus,
the ﬁrst policy-relevant implication of our analysis is that simply stopping
drone strikes is unlikely to be a step that would be suﬃcient for a diﬀerent
outcome, and that was is required instead is a more comprehensive and
sustained conﬂict settlement strategy that considers these factors and their
interaction in the speciﬁc context of Pakistan.
Second, our analysis thus also suggests that a more carefully calibrated
drone policy, as part of an equally reﬁned settlement strategy, would have
better prospects of success in Pakistan, and conceivably beyond. There is
some evidence of this already: US drone strikes continue, but are much
reduced in number and have caused fewer civilian casualties,81 the
Pakistani government has restored at least some of its authority in FATA
(Anon 2015), paving the way for the resettlement of 94% of the displaced in
their homes (Zia 2017). Additionally, the diﬀerential eﬀect of the drone
campaign over time suggests that it is not necessarily incompatible with
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conﬂict settlement, provided that careful consideration is given to the timing
and sequencing of pressure (e.g., strikes) and incentives (e.g., strikes being
suspended). This is an area in which further research might elicit more
concrete policy recommendations, including about pressure can remain
credible without undermining the prospects of negotiations (because of the
consequences of leadership decapitation and blowback) and how incentives
can sustain positive momentum towards and during talks rather than being
abused by either side to improve its position ahead of renewed violent
confrontation.
Third, and directly related to this second implication, our ﬁndings indicate
that any positive impact on the peace process of changes in drones policy
critically depends on factors related to the local conﬂict parties. The TTP has
reduced capability, with their infrastructure in North Waziristan destroyed,
the loss of more than 2000 ﬁghters according to military sources (Bennett-
Jones 2017), and another military operation, Radd-ul-Fasad, inside Pakistan’s
urban centres aﬀecting recruitment. Intra-group rivalry has brought more
fragmentation, exempliﬁed by the split between TTP and its aﬃliate Jamaat-
ul-Ahrar in November 2017 (Ahmad 2017). However, the TTP and aﬃliated
groups continue to launch attacks from the border areas of Afghanistan,
albeit diminished in frequency and target value (Stancati and Totakhil
2015). The trajectory implied in this is not one of an imminent resumption
of negotiations. The Pakistani state appears to consider a military defeat of
the TTP insurgency still to be possible, while the TTP has retained suﬃcient
capacity to resist, yet remains too fragmented internally to become a credible
negotiation partner should the government decide to change course.
Regardless of the military balance between the sides, the fundamental
disruption of the social, political and cultural fabric of tribal structures in FATA
has yet to be undone. Deployment of the military in the area for the ﬁrst time
since 1947 and the Army’s assumption of administrative functions had
already begun the process of undermining the traditional authority of the
Jirga, but the CIA-operated drone campaign, driven by US rather than local
security interests, furthered the erosion. The covert nature of the campaign
also undermined the credibility of the Pakistani state, which found it diﬃcult
to acknowledge to its citizens the level of co-operation with the US in the face
of anti-US public sentiment. This exacerbated state-society distrust to the
beneﬁt of the militants in FATA and beyond. Merely restoring the ‘writ of the
state’ in FATA will not be suﬃcient to re-establish the trust necessary for
a sustainable conﬂict settlement process. Rather the Pakistani state needs to
rebuild its legitimate authority through concrete action so that the residents
of the now province of Khyber Pakhthunkhwa do not perceive themselves
as second-class citizens less worthy of the state’s protection and service
delivery.
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Fourth, any conceivable changes to drones policy must be calculated
against the probability of these local factors and balanced against unavoid-
able trade-oﬀs with regard to other policy objectives currently pursued
through drones (especially counter-terrorism). As long as local conditions
are such that with or without drone strikes no settlement process is con-
ceivable, there are few if any incentives for the U.S. to abandon what is
arguably its currently best policy option in a protracted counter-terrorism
campaign in and beyond Pakistan, motivated by homeland security more
than by conﬂict settlement. Put diﬀerently, only once local actors have
created a positive dynamic for conﬂict settlement that demonstrably
assuages US concerns about terrorism is it likely that joint US-Pakistani eﬀorts
towards a carefully re-calibrated drones policy can be meaningfully aligned
with a conﬂict settlement strategy.
Finally, even if the counter-terrorism driven US drone campaign could be
reconciled with a Pakistani strategy to advance peace negotiations, both
sides have yet to achieve a level of strategic coherence to enable
a reciprocal recalibration of their respective strategies. Here, too, future
research is necessary to identify more clearly the conditions under which
what kind of strategic coherence could be established and what it would
need to entail.
Until then, the likely continuation of pursuing parallel and, at least partially
incompatible, strategies by the two presumptive allies will prolong the
catalytic eﬀects of drone strikes that we have highlighted in our analysis.
Any possibility of conﬂict settlement between the Pakistani state and the TTP,
thus, is likely to remain elusive for some time to come.
Notes
1. FATA has been incorporated into the province of Khyber Pakhthunkhwa in
2018. As our focus is mainly on the period 2013–14, we will refer to the areas
as FATA throughout.
2. From 2004 to 2016, 72 per cent of the strikes have been aimed at targets in
North Waziristan and 23 per cent in South Waziristan (Foundation for Defense
of Democracies 2018).
3. These are the upper estimates by The Bureau of Investigative Journalism
(2018a).
4. This view is widely held in journalistic accounts (e.g., Ahmad 2013, Masood
and Mehsud 2013, Peralta 2013) and within parts of the scholarly community
(e.g., Shaw 2013, Boyle 2013, Fair and Hamza 2016). For a more nuanced
perspective, see Williams (2010), International Crisis Group (2013) and Fair
(2014).
5. In addition to already cited sources, see, for example, also Bergen and
Tiedemann (2011), Matulich (2012), Plaw and Fricker (2012), and Boyle (2013a).
In addition to already cited sources, see, for example, also Bergen and
Tiedemann (2011), Matulich (2012), Plaw and Fricker (2012), and Boyle (2013).
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6. There is also a related literature on the new spatial dimensions of drone warfare
(e.g., Adamson 2016), on drones in the context of just war theory (e.g., O’Driscoll
2018), on the determinants of public support for drone strikes (e.g., Kreps and
Wallace 2016), and on the decision calculus of states to employ airpower (Allen
and Machain 2018), all of which are beyond the scope of our argument.
7. The few scholarly discussions of this relationship also predate the period of
interest here. See, for example, Zaidi (2010) and Ahmed (2013). For
a sophisticated critique of the latter, see Fair (2014), pp. 226–229.
8. Talks between the TTP and the government remained limited to one prelimin-
ary meeting between nominated intermediaries on 6 February 2014 and
a single round of direct talks between representatives of both sides on
26 March 2014.
9. Note, too, in this context work by Silverman which demonstrates that pre-
existing bias (e.g., pro- vs. anti-Taliban) shapes perceptions of events (such as
drone strikes) and these, in turn, reinforce attitudes (such as anti-Americanism).
See Silverman (2018).
10. To our knowledge, the most comprehensive empirical assessment of blowback
to date is Shah (2018), who ﬁnds no convincing evidence of blowback at the
local level.
11. We detail our operationalisation procedure for all potential explanations, cor-
responding expected observations, and suitable data and data sources in
Appendix A.
12. For more on these speciﬁc methodological implications of such ﬁeldwork are
discussed, among others, by Fujii (2010), Malthaner (2014), Desrosiers and
Vucetic (2018), and Knott (2015).
13. One of our interlocutors, for example, cut short the interview, saying, ‘Please
don’t ask me to elaborate . . . We are sitting in this (Intelligence) oﬃce . . . they
know I am talking to you . . . Please only quote me on the drones not the army or
the TTP. This is all I have to say.’ Another started the interview insisting, ‘Please
don’t nameme in your study . . . my family is in [XXX] and the TTP can label us as
spies. It is up to them whether they shoot you or behead you.’
14. Given the security situation and the high levels of mutual distrust, interviewing
TTP oﬃcials was simply not feasible. We circumvented this problem by inter-
viewing people with knowledge of the Taliban positions on negotiations and
triangulated this with oﬃcial Taliban statements and insights provided by
a range of diﬀerent local experts and analysts.
15. The local expert is a Pakistani academic with a PhD from the UK, the external
case expert and the comparativist are both UK-trained and based academics.
16. There are many deﬁnitions of grey literature, we rely on the so-called Prague
deﬁnition as elaborated by Schöpfel (2011): ‘Grey literature stands for manifold
document types produced on all levels of Government, academics, business
and industry in print and electronic formats that are protected by intellectual
property rights, of suﬃcient quality to be collected and preserved by library
holdings or institutional repositories, but not controlled by commercial publish-
ers i.e., where publishing is not the primary activity of the producing body.’
17. See Appendix B for interview questions and interviewees, as well as for details
on the survey.
18. We used NVivo 11 for Windows for coding and running all data-related
queries that form the basis of the descriptive statistics we provide. Coding
followed procedures recommended by Bazeley and Jackson (2013). The data
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was coded in three rounds: the ﬁrst round looked for evidence to support any
of the six hypotheses individually; the second round, following a structuring
of the knowledge and understanding gained, looked for connections between
the diﬀerent explanations; and the third round then employed speciﬁc text
searches to further illustrate and evidence these connections. By way of
illustration, the ﬁrst round, for example, identiﬁed mistrust of the army and
the Government, collusion between the Pakistani and US Governments, and
the destruction of the tribal system as frequently mentioned factors nega-
tively aﬀecting the possibility of a conﬂict settlement. In round two,
a common connection found between these three themes was anti-
Americanism, and therefore the third round employed a text search in tran-
script for ‘America’ and ‘US’ to probe, and code, this connection in more
detail.
19. For example, 19 of our 30 interlocutors from across the whole range of our
sources mentioned psychological stress among residents of the tribal areas as
one of the negative consequences of drone use (for strikes as well as surveil-
lance). This eﬀect has also been widely reported in the media and the grey
literature.
20. For example, we are careful in our analysis of the impact of drone strikes on
fragmentation and the diﬃculties that this created for negotiations (see below),
showing that there was agreement on the fact of fragmentation, but diﬀerent
perceptions of its consequences within the political and military establishment
and oﬀering our analysis of this by emphasising that fragmentation created
a limited opening for exploratory talks but inhibited any progress beyond such
an initial stage.
21. As we demonstrate further below, this was not the purpose of the US drone
campaign, which had counter-terrorism as its main objective.
22. Interview 003.
23. Interview 001.
24. Interview 008.
25. Interview 003.
26. Interview 013.
27. Personal communication from an intelligence oﬃcial, 9 June 2014.
28. Interview 017.
29. Personal communication from an intelligence oﬃcial, 9 June 2014; see also
Rehman (2014).
30. Interview 014.
31. Interview 018.
32. Interview 017.
33. Interview 018.
34. Interview 003.
35. Interview 023.
36. Interview 014.
37. Interview 023.
38. Such as terrorist attacks on Pakistan Army’s Headquarter in Rawalpindi on
10 October 2009 and Mehran Naval Base in Karachi on 22 May 2011. See
Anon (2012a).
39. Interview 007.
40. Interview 006.
41. Interview 006.
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42. Interview 007. The interviewee, former President Musharraf, in this context also
made the following point: ‘I wish we (Pakistan) had drones, then we could use
drones along with other weapon systems and capabilities like we are employ-
ing in the ongoing operation. In that case militancy will not spread as we will
eradicate it totally.’
43. Interview 011.
44. Interview 014.
45. Interview 013.
46. Interviews 004, 009, 015, 016, 018, 020–023, 025, and Group Interviews 26–30.
47. Group Interviews 26–30.
48. This must also be seen in connection with ﬁndings on the rise in anti-state
sentiment as a consequence of the drones campaign (14% of all respondents
ranking this as their ﬁrst choice) and the fact that only 18% of all respondents
thought that there was no cooperation between the Pakistani government and
the US on drones (as opposed to 61% who thought there was cooperation on
selected targets and 21% who thought there was full cooperation).
49. On the contrary, most of our other ﬁndings are very much in line with Shah’s
conclusions, including on the negative perceptions of militants, of the army, the
commitment of the government to the tribal areas, and the long-term erosion
of tribal structures. See Shah (2018).
50. For example, in light of the earlier point about constantly lingering suspicions
that peace talks, and the suspension of ﬁghting, would be an opportunity for
militants to re-arm, re-train, and re-group, a perception of increased recruit-
ment would make it diﬃcult to argue for talks because of an expectation of
facing a stronger opponent in the future.
51. Interview 014. Almost identical sentiments were expressed in Interviews
001–004, 006, 008, 010, 012, 016, 025, and Group Interviews 26–30.
Collaboration between the CIA and Pakistani government has also been con-
ﬁrmed on the basis of ‘CIA documents and Pakistani diplomatic memos
obtained by The Washington Post’ (Miller and Woodward 2013).
52. Interview 008.
53. Interview 010.
54. See Section 5 for further details.
55. Interview 016.
56. Interviews 014 and 016.
57. Notably, there was no evidence in support of Hypothesis 6 concerning the
detrimental eﬀect of an external mediator or lack thereof.
58. Among the few exceptions, see Fair (2014, pp. 224–26), International Crisis
Group (2013), and Williams (Williams 2008, 2010). See also Collombier and
Roy (‘Tribes and Global Jihadism – Google Books’ n.d.).
59. There is a rich literature on the history of the tribal system and its governance in
Pakistan, which generally emphasises the importance of tribal elders and the
jirga in the administration of justice and maintenance of stability in the tribal
area (e.g., Idris 2010, Lyon 2002, Yousaf 2019). See, for example, Ali (1999,
p. 188) who argues that a jirga’s main ‘function is to settle peacefully an existing
situation more than to judge right or wrong, determine guilt, or pass sentence.’
In addition, the restoration of the jirga system is also considered as an essential
contribution to ‘uniting people and ensuring peace in the region’ (Community
Appraisal and Motivation Programme and Saferworld 2012; Z. S. Ahmed and
Yousaf 2018, Khayyam 2016).
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60. Interview 002.
61. Note, too, the longer roots of alienation between tribes and government as
documented by Zeb and Ahmed (2019).
62. Interview 017.
63. Interview 021.
64. Interview 017.
65. Interview 022.
66. Interview 014.
67. Interview 021.
68. For a detailed analysis see Ahmed (2013) and Shinwari (2008).
69. See Kakar (2014). Also Interview 018,.
70. Interview 020. Taliban reprisal against local elders was also noted in Interviews
001, 002, 008, 010, 013, 014, 016, 018, 019, 021, and Group Interviews 26–30.
71. Survey 2014.
72. Interview 028.
73. Interview 001.
74. Interview 009.
75. Survey 2014.
76. Interviews 004 and 013.
77. Interview 009.
78. Survey 2014.
79. Interview 003.
80. Interview 025. This point about the Pakistani state’s failure to protect the tribal
system was very prominent in our interviews with a wide range of interlocutors,
e.g., Interviews 002, 003, 006, 010, 012, 016, 018, 019, 021, and Group Interviews
26–30.
81. US drone strikes have reduced in number from 13 in 2015 to 3 in 2016 and
increased to 5 in 2017. Targets were members of the Afghan Taliban and
Haqqani network. See full data provided by The Bureau of Investigative
Journalism (2018b).
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Appendices
Appendix A. Potential explanations, corresponding expected
observations, and indicative data sources and data
Potential Explanation
Expected Observations (illustrative
examples)
Data sources and data suitable
as evidence (illustrative
examples)
1. Leadership decapitation
eliminated credible negotia-
tors on the TTP side,
increased diﬃculties for
new/remaining leaders to
discuss negotiations in a
safe environment, required
the movement to save face
by withdrawing from a nas-
cent peace process, and
hardened members’ and
new leaders’ resolve to seek
a military solution.
● Assassinations of insurgent lea-
ders is followed by a break-
down in negotiations, Taliban
withdrawal from negotiations,
or break-oﬀ of pre-negotiation
engagements.
● No Taliban negotiation team is
nominated and no joint nego-
tiation platform emerges.
● Attacks on government forces
and alleged collaborators
increases.
● Taliban rhetoric becomes more
aggressive, stated opposition
to negotiated settlement
increases.
● Relevant interlocutor state-
ments in interviews and
survey (e.g., pointing out
diﬃculty of remaining senior
leaders to meet and discuss
negotiations).
● Media coverage and second-
ary/grey literature reporting
lack of meetings and inter-
nal debate/consensus
among Taliban factions.
2. Civilian casualties and
damage to infrastructure
increased support for the
Taliban, swelled its ranks
with new recruits, and made
it more diﬃcult for “moder-
ates” to make a case for a
negotiated settlement.
● Surge in expressions of support
for Taliban, increase in state-
ments of intent to join their
ranks.
● Increase in hard-line statements
on Taliban strategy in absolute
terms and/or relative to advo-
cacy for negotiated settlement.
● Relevant interlocutor state-
ments in interviews and
survey (e.g., discussing their
own knowledge of increased
support as a response to
civilian casualties).
● Media coverage and second-
ary/grey literature reporting
shifting public support and
internal debates among
Taliban factions.
3. Amid the alleged complicity
of the Pakistani state (espe-
cially government and army)
in the U.S. drone campaign,
the government lost legiti-
macy and credibility as a
partner for the Taliban in
any potential peace process.
● Denouncing of collusion bet
ween government/army and
US.
● Expressions of distrust in nego-
tiation process and state
representatives.
● Break-oﬀ of any formal or infor-
mal contacts, likely to be
accompanied by statements
that do not recognise legiti-
macy of state and/or its
representatives.
● Relevant interlocutor state-
ments in interviews and
survey (e.g., condemning
collusion, denying govern-
ment legitimacy).
● Media coverage and grey lit-
erature reporting disen-
gagement by Taliban
because of government/
army collusion.
(Continued)
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Appendix B.
Questions for Semi-Structured Interviews
(1) What is the impact of US drone attacks on Pakistan’s security?
(2) Do drone attacks aﬀect the possibility of initiating/sustaining Government-TTP
peace talks?
(3) What is the impact of drone strikes on the people of Waziristan?
(Continued).
Potential Explanation
Expected Observations (illustrative
examples)
Data sources and data suitable
as evidence (illustrative
examples)
4. There is no mutually hurting
stalemate between the par-
ties, with either the govern-
ment expecting to be able
to defeat the Taliban milita-
rily, or the Taliban consider-
ing itself strong enough to
hold out and gradually
improve its bargaining posi-
tion over time.
● Sides do not take heavy casual-
ties, see no or no signiﬁcant
drop in domestic/external sup-
port, and overall retain pre-
vious levels of territorial
control.
● Relevant interlocutor state-
ments in interviews and
survey (e.g., conﬁrming
enduring military capabil-
ities and political will to
ﬁght).
● Media coverage and second-
ary/grey literature reporting
no signiﬁcant casualty levels
and/or ability to compen-
sate with new recruits or
reserves, and/or continuing
ability to mobilise resources.
5. Both sides may be too frag-
mented internally to make
credible, and thus accepta-
ble, oﬀers to initiate formal
negotiations. The opposing
side sees little likelihood in
achieving and retaining
desirable concessions in a
negotiation process, in part
because some factions may
deny the other party’s
legitimacy.
● Internal debates prevent the
emergence of a joint negotia-
tion platform.
● Where a platform has been
publicised, factions disown it
or refuse to endorse it.
● One or more factions publicly
reject the legitimacy of the
negotiation process and/or
that of the legitimacy of their
own or the other side’s
representatives.
● One or more factions refuse to
negotiate with one or more
factions on the other side, rule
out concessions, and/or threa-
ten to torpedo ratiﬁcation and/
or implementation of any
agreements.
● Relevant interlocutor state-
ments in interviews and
survey (e.g., noting internal
power struggles and/or
emergence/persistence of
veto players).
● Media coverage and second-
ary/grey literature reporting
inability by one or both sides
to forge consensus across
diﬀerent factions over strat-
egy and/or legitimacy of
other side’s negotiators.
6. The settlement process lacks
external mediators and
guarantors that could bring
the parties to the table and
contribute to sustaining a
negotiated settlement.
● Mediation is not part of the
pre/negotiation and/or media-
tors are ineﬀective in bringing
relevant parties to the table,
keeping them there, and/or
enabling them to reach a
settlement.
● Relevant interlocutor state-
ments in interviews and
survey (e.g., pointing to lack
of available or acceptable
mediators).
● Media coverage and second-
ary/grey literature reporting
noted lack of mediation as
obstacle to constructive
negotiations.
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(4) Do you personally know someone who has been aﬀected by drone attacks? If yes,
would you like to share details with us?
(5) Did Musharraf’s military regime allow US drone strikes in FATA?
(6) Do civilian governments have a similar approach?
(7) How do the tribal people perceive the role of the Pakistani state?
(8) Do drone strikes violate Pakistan’s sovereignty and human rights?
(9) What is the eﬀect of drone attacks on US-Pakistani relations?
Interviewees
Note: The majority of our interlocutors did not request anonymisation when oﬀered
the opportunity. Hence, we provide details on most interlocutors below, but anon-
ymise where this was requested.
Reference (Anonymised) Interlocutor
Interviewee 001 Tribesman
Interviewee 002 Senator Afrasaib Khattak (Pashtun Senator and Chairman, Senate Committee on
Human Rights)
Interviewee 003 Ambassador Ayaz Wazir (Diplomat from South Waziristan)
Interviewee 004 Brigadier Said Nazir (Retired Brigadier and defence analyst)
Interviewee 005 Dr. Mowadat Hussain Rana (Psychiatrist)
Interviewee 006 Gen. Ehsan ul Haq (Former Chairman Joint Services and ISI Chief)
Interviewee 007 Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf (Former President and Army Chief)
Interviewee 008 Haﬁz Hasan Wali (Tribal Malik)
Interviewee 009 Karim Khan (Tribesman related to drone victims)
Interviewee 010 Lt. Gen. Alam Khattak (Secretary Defence and former Commander, Frontier Corps)
Interviewee 011 Pir Aqil Shah [Tribal Malik]
Interviewee 012 Journalist from North Waziristan
Interviewee 013 Journalist from North Waziristan
Interviewee 014 Senator Prof. Ibrahim Khan (President Jamaat-i-Islami [JI], Khyber Pakhtunkhawa)
Interviewee 015 Raﬁq Dawar (Tribesman related to drone victims)
Interviewee 016 Rahimullah Yusufzai (Journalist and expert on terrorism in FATA)
Interviewee 017 Rustam Shah Mohmand (Diplomat from Mohmand, FATA)
Interviewee 018 Saifullah Mehsud (Director, FATA Research Centre, Islamabad, from South
Waziristan)
Interviewee 019 Salahuddin Wazir (Tribesman)
Interviewee 020 Tribesman
Interviewee 021 Tribesman
Interviewee 022 Shafqat Mahmood (Member of Parliament, Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaf [PTI])
Interviewee 023 Barrister Shahzad Akbar (Director Foundation for Fundamental Rights, Islamabad)
Interviewee 024 AVM Shahzad Chaudhry (Retired Airforce Commander and defence analyst)
Interviewee 025 Alam Khan (Tribal Malik)
Group interview with tribal students
Interviewee 026 Tribal student
Interviewee 027 Tribal student
Interviewee 028 Tribal student
Interviewee 029 Tribal student
Interviewee 030 Tribal student
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SURVEY DATA
Based on random sampling, two surveys, using the same set of eleven questions, were
carried out before and after the launch of the Zarb-i-Azb military operation in North
Waziristan in June 2014. The two-stage nature of the survey was not originally
planned. Prioritising safe access to respondents, we had initially planned to carry
out one survey only in the D.I. Khan IDP camp bordering South Waziristan, where the
majority of displaced people are from South Waziristan, as well as among those who
had privately moved to larger cities. The launch of the Zarb-i-Azbmilitary operation in
North Waziristan in June 2014, however, created an additional opportunity to extend
the survey to IDPs from North Waziristan, many of whom ﬂed to the Bannu IDP camp.
Consequently, we carried out a second round of the survey there in September 2014.
In total, we approached 400 participants across the two survey rounds in areas
where IDPs from the Waziristan agency were living in government-built, army-run
camps (Bannu, D. I. Khan) or in the cities to which they had moved privately (e.g.,
Peshawar, and Islamabad). The multiple-choice questionnaire used in the surveys was
in Urdu, the national language of Pakistan. Each respondent was required to select no
more than one answer in response to each question, and they were told that non-
responses were allowed, giving them the option to choose not to answer questions
they were not comfortable with. We did not require a justiﬁcation of non-answers. On
this basis, we received between 359 and 389 eligible answers for each of the
questions.
In insecure areas access to participants was facilitated through personal contacts in
independent think-tanks and the Pakistani Army. In later stages of the survey, these
local contacts also acted as enumerators collecting data from our respondents.
Enumerators were fully trained and briefed on the research project.
In view of cultural sensitivities, only male respondents were contacted. Survey
participants were aged between 19 and 55 years, with the majority between 25 to
40 years. The participants belonged to the two major Mahsud and Wazir tribes as well
as the minority Dawar tribe of Waziristan. The sample included both fully literate
respondents and those without competent reading ability.
In cases where respondents had limited reading ability, the investigator or enu-
merator ensured that the questions were read out clearly. It was ensured that the
person concerned was competent to make a decision and that the consent was
voluntary. In the case of those not well-versed in Urdu, the questions were explained
in the local language, Pashto, by translators.
Respondents’ consent was obtained and signiﬁed, in most cases, by their signature
or thumb-impression on the back of the questionnaire or on an attached consent
form. In a minority of cases, respondents were not comfortable to give their names or
signatures. In these cases, oral consent was obtained.
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